



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# Central Intelligence Bulletin

**Secret** 50 21 June 1969

No. 0148/6921 June 1969

## Central Intelligence Bulletin

#### **CONTENTS**

South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

USSR - Communist China: Moscow is urging Western nations to withhold recognition from Peking. (Page 3)

Japan-Okinawa: Japan's largest labor confederation is planning agitation against the extension of the US-Japan security treaty. (Page 4)

West Germany - Poland: The visit of Berlin's Mayor Schuetz to Poland left the door open for

further talks. (Page 6)

<u>Colombia</u>: Reunification of Conservative Party


factions gives a new complexion to preparations for the national elections in 1970. (Page 7)

Nigeria: Attacks against oil fields (Page 9)

Burma: Foreign minister's dismissal (Page 9)

25X1

### Approved For Release 2004/65-A-RDP79T00975A014000030001-2



South Vietnam: Heavy fighting in Tay Ninh Province tapered off on 20 June, and enemy military activity elsewhere generally was limited to occasional shellings and small-unit engagements.

The two-day Communist offensive thrust in Tay Ninh carried on the virtual campaign the enemy has been conducting in that area. The fighting in Tay Ninh city was the third time since last September that enemy forces have tested the defenses of that provincial capital.

The extent of the continuing Communist effort in Tay Ninh suggests that this province plays an important role in longer term enemy plans. Tay Ninh has long been a center of Communist operations, and the population has been subjected to special blandishments and intimidation.

The Communists may well be looking toward a period when a cease-fire and arrangements for a settlement lead to a head-on political confrontation with South Vietnamese authorities for control of the province. Tay Ninh is one of the areas where the Communists recently set up a provincial-level "revolutionary committee," and enemy forces are spotting po-

tential candidates for a postwar government.

\* \* \* \*

25X1

21 Jun 69

Central Intelligence Bulletin

1

25X1

USSR - Communist China: The Soviet Union is stepping up its efforts to isolate China by urging Western nations to withhold recognition from the Peking government.

In the past week Soviet Embassy officials in Rome, including the ambassador, have called at the Foreign Ministry in an effort to discourage the Italians from recognizing Peking. The Soviets urged that "all states...refrain from any action" which would encourage Peking's "present policies." One of the Soviet officials noted that Canada, Belgium, and West Germany were considering actions that would provide such "encouragement," but that the isolation of China might be the only way to curb its "aggressive policies."

have taken yet to discourage new diplomatic contacts with Peking, although for some time Moscow has clearly been unenthusiastic about them.
The Soviets will probably make similar approaches to other countries considering the recognition of Peking. Moscow's decision may indicate that a more active anti-Chinese policy will be pursued by the Soviets after the current meeting in Moscow of Soviet ambassadors to Asia breaks up.

25X1

25X1 25X1 Japan-Okinawa: The leftist Sohyo labor confederation, Japan's largest, has adopted a blueprint for agitation against the extension of the US-Japan security treaty over the next year, culminating in a "general strike" in June 1970.

Nationwide demonstrations on 23 June, the ninth anniversary of the date the security treaty became effective, are planned as the first of a series of rallies, strikes, and meetings to be held nearly every month until next spring. Sohyo leaders have indicated that the labor organization will also act in sympathy when other antitreaty forces take public action. On the 23rd, for example, Sohyo will support leftist demonstrations in Okinawa.

A Sohyo officer has privately told a US Embassy official that events on Okinawa will heavily influence the scale and intensity of Sohyo's action in Japan. Sohyo has been unable, however, to attract much support in recent years for its demonstrations against the US role in Vietnam and Okinawa.

:	Police	in bo	th Japar	and (	Okinawa	have mad	le
exten	sive p	r <mark>e</mark> para	tions fo	or the	demonst	rations	planned
for 2	3 June	in or	der to d	curb e	xtremist	student	s who
might	try to	o prov	oke viol	Lence.			

West Germany - Poland: The recent visit of West Berlin Mayor Schuetz to Poland left the door open for further talks.

In his talk with Foreign Minister Jedrychowski, Schuetz claims that he detected a genuine Polish interest in talking with the West Germans, particularly about the Oder-Neisse issue. Schuetz feels that the form of an agreement was not really important to the Poles as long as the present boundary was really accepted. The mayor also believes that the Poles are interested in increasing trade and cultural relations with West Berlin.

Schuetz has asserted that his reception was cordial and without political pitfalls. Challenging the mayor's optimistic view, however, a Bonn foreign office official and the resident West German trade mission chief in Warsaw have noted that the Poles sought to use the visit to promote the Communist thesis that West Berlin is a separate political entity.

The Polish press has not yet pressed this
point, and West German press and public comment on the Schuetz visit has been favorable. Schuetz'
fellow Social Democrats will probably cite his visit in the forthcoming election campaign as a
success for the party's Eastern policy.

25X1

Colombia: Reunification of Conservative Party factions gives a whole new complexion to preparations for the national elections in 1970.

Under the National Front coalition, the long-dominant Liberal and Conservative parties agreed to alternate the presidency from 1958 to 1974 and to divide other government positions equally. It is the Conservatives' turn to choose a candidate, who will be the last to serve as president under the coalition arrangement. As the minority party, the Conservatives plan to use the coming presidential term to strengthen and broaden their political influence before open political competition resumes in 1974.

The declaration of reunification, signed on 18 June, reintegrates a dissident faction that had opposed close cooperation with the Liberals. The dissidents now have agreed to join in a broad-based party convention to choose a single Conservative candidate.

This move reduces the danger that ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla might profit by a split in the coalition to win the presidency. The effect, however, on the prospects of President Lleras' preferred presidential candidate, Ambassador to the US Misael Pastrana, is not yet clear. The reunification will damage the already-announced candidacy of maverick Conservative Belisario Betancur. He may persist, however, with the support of labor, student, and church groups who are seeking a voice to combat the closed system of old-line party politics.

25X1

## Biafrans Launch Attacks on Nigerian Oil Installations Benin City Enugu Biafran aircraft damages storage tank Oilfield (Gulf) Orlu. Qwerri Oilfield (Shell-BP) New pipeline Biafrans blow up two small pipelines Port Harcourt Oilfield (Shell-BP) Trans:Niger Pipeline Bonny Oil Evacuation Terminal BIAFRAN CONTROLLED AREA EQUATORIAL GUINE FERNANDO PO 95381 6-69 CIA

#### NOTES

Nigeria: The Biafrans have carried out their first attacks against producing oil fields. infiltrators recently blew up two small pipelines at one oilfield, temporarily reducing production there. On 18 June, rockets from one of the secessionists' recently acquired light aircraft damaged a storage tank at another field, which, although reportedly empty at the time, is important to a major new pipeline system scheduled to go into operation next month. Earlier this month the Biafrans said they were determined to stop the flow of Nigerian oil, which amounts to about 600,000 barrels per day and is a major source of the federal government's foreign exchange. (Map)

Burma: The prospects for civilianizing the military regime, an idea broached by Ne Win last fall, have been set back. Foreign Minister U Thi Han, the only civilian member of the cabinet, was "permitted to resign" on 18 June, ostensibly because of his "anxiety" that his friendship with disaffected military officers and civilian opponents of the Ne Win regime would interfere with his official duties. The discharge of U Thi Han, who reportedly has been highly regarded by General Ne Win, is indicative of strong opposition within the ruling military Revolutionary Council to any political changes.

(continued)

.

Secret Pproved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014000030001-2

#### **Secret**